

STOICISM: SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE STATE OF THE ART

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It would be more than a little boring, if not insulting, if I offered nothing more than a conspectus of what has been going on in the study of Stoic philosophy for the last few decades. So I should like to spice my narrative of problems and solutions with a few comments from time to time about where I think we are at the moment, and where I think we should be going in the next few years—not to speak of where we *seem* to be going, for better or for worse—but usually for better—in the next few years. In approaching an essentially tedious exercise in bibliography in this way, I shall also provide myself with an excuse for not even attempting to be comprehensive. For it would be pure arrogance to claim that I have assimilated all that has been written about Stoicism in the last few years, and pure impertinence to claim that I could evaluate the scholarship in the field from some godlike eminence. In fact I have half withdrawn from the field myself, after having busied myself with it for more than fifteen years; but having done that I should like to look back at the receding landscape and try and see what has happened since I first began to take a serious interest in it. As I said, I shall even feel emboldened to offer a few suggestions as to what I should like those better equipped than I to undertake in the coming years.

After the second world war the study of Stoicism was almost at a standstill. Of course work was going on, but the subject was still dominated by the monuments of the past, by Zeller's *History* which basically determined that all Hellenistic thought (and all that even more decadent stuff which was to follow) was the product of a failure of nerve—to use Dodds' later phrase—supposedly brought about by the supposed decline of the *polis* as a result of the campaigns of Alexander and the autocracies of his successors. We had, of course, the memorials of scholarship of those earlier days, above all von Arnim's *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* and Pohlenz' recently published *Die Stoa*, as well as the magnificent late nineteenth century writings of Adolph Bonhoeffer on Epictetus.¹

Of the changes to come there were of course foreshadowings, but the scene in general was bleak. Much of the study of ancient philosophy in English had degenerated into philology or comparative anthropology at best or antiquarianism at worst; philosophers and philologists seemed to be drifting further and further apart. Part of the problem, as so often, was the tyranny of the undergraduate curriculum. It is difficult to teach Stoicism to people who know next to nothing of Plato and Aristotle—and it probably should not be attempted—and although I am told that

in contemporary Oxford Jonathan Barnes and Julia Annas offer an introduction to philosophy as a whole through readings in Sextus Empiricus, through the battles of Stoics (indeed of dogmatists in general in the ancient sense of the word) and Sceptics, that is only possible in the context of a view of philosophy which sees it largely or wholly as logic and epistemology. At the level of publication, of course, the Stoic-Academic battle has recently been pursued fruitfully, especially by Burnyeat and Striker.^{1A}

It would be merely boring, as I said, to give you a bibliography of Stoicism since 1945, and I do not propose to do so. Rather I want to look at some of the major areas of progress since that date, giving credit to those I mention while in no way wishing to insult those I omit, and to include in these comments some recommendations and wishes. For the study of ancient philosophy in general is, I believe, of more central importance—and recognized to be so—for the study of philosophy, for the attempt to do philosophy, as a whole, than it has been for years; the 19th century delusion that the history of modern philosophy is basically the history of unmitigated progress has begun to wane. Within this broader picture the study of Stoicism has, I think, much to commend it to philosophers of the present day and of days immediately to come.

There is little doubt that it has been the rediscovery of Stoic logic which has spearheaded our new appreciation of the Stoic school as a whole. Lukasiewicz² and Bochenski³ led the way among the professional logicians; the Kneales' *Development of Logic* (Oxford 1962) and the works of Mates,⁴ Frede,⁵ Mueller,⁶ Brunschwig⁷ and many others have both developed these studies at a purely professional level and made their findings available to a wider range of philosophers and scholars interested in Stoicism. But, as Mueller has pointed out,⁸ comparatively little has been done with what the Stoics made of their logic; indeed increasingly, and in my view unfortunately, Stoic logic has begun to recede from the general study of Stoic philosophy. Doubtless this is because of the significance of formal questions in modern logic, but one has to say that it is an un-Stoic attitude. The Stoics themselves have a wide conception of logic, which even includes semantics, and they always wished, at least in theory, to connect their logic closely with physics and ethics. Epictetus expresses the point well: is it to yell "Well done" at some stock little word-play that people travel from home, parents and friends? That is not the spirit of Socrates, or of Zeno, or of Cleanthes. And again, we should practice dying (in the spirit of the *Phaedo*) rather than the correct use of syllogisms.⁹ Yet this is the same Epictetus, remember, to whom alone we owe a detailed account of the famous Master Argument of Diodorus Cronus.

I propose at this point to change tack. So far I have concentrated on one of the important reasons for the renewed interest in the Stoics. Now I should like to look at the results of this awakened interest in areas other than that of logic itself, or in theory of knowledge and theory of

meaning where much enlightenment has also been produced by recent labourers.¹⁰ The task can be tackled in two ways: either by following the original Stoic division of philosophy into logic, physics and ethics, or by considering the origins of the school and its development. I shall begin with the second approach, after first observing that we are now well supplied with good general surveys and quasi-general surveys of the field, some more idiosyncratic than others; one can think of the books of Edelstein,¹¹ Goldschmidt,¹² Long,¹³ Rist¹⁴ and Sandbach.¹⁵ But if surveys of reasonable quality proliferate, and have much in common, debate is heated on problems concerned with the origins of Stoicism as a movement. Most investigators recognize the indebtedness of Zeno and Chrysippus to a number of earlier sources and teachers: Heraclitus, Plato, Polemo and a motley of Cynics and Megarians. But the role of Aristotle in the growth of Stoicism is much disputed. Some (Long,¹⁶ Lloyd,¹⁷ Rist,¹⁸ Hahm¹⁹) give him a high place on a wide range of philosophical topics; others, particularly Sandbach,²⁰ are inclined to minimize his influence, reflecting a view, due above all to I. Düring, that Aristotle's general influence in his own lifetime and immediately after his death was very limited. Specific philosophical problems associated with the dispute are legion, ranging from free will and necessity²¹ to the origins of Stoic cosmology²⁰ and cosmobiology.²³ Such questions need further detailed work not only on the Stoic side, but on the side of late and (in my view) highly influential late Aristotelian texts like the *De Motu* and the *De Generatione Animalium*.

The problem of Aristotelian influence and/or the reaction to Aristotle is also debated among those concerned with the conflicting claims of the ancient (and modern?) adherents of Stoic and Peripatetic logic. Problems arise in regard to more formal questions about logical priority and validity,²⁴ and in regard to debates which spill over from logic to physics (in the ancient sense of those terms) raised by such matters as Aristotle's famous sea-battle tomorrow in *De Interpretatione* 9 and by the parallel developments of "Megarian" logic on questions of possibility and necessity at the hands of Philo of Megara, Diodorus Cronus and Chrysippus himself.

And there is also the debated but still unresolved problem of the influence of the Cynics. How far was Zeno's *Republic* written "on the dog's tail"? Where and why did Zeno break with the Cynics, and how far was he conscious of the connection of that break with his apparently growing interest in the philosophy of nature?^{24A} As for the philosophy of nature itself, there is a growing tendency to see it against an Aristotelian background, as I have said, but a good deal more needs to be done; and a good deal more light is, I think, available to be shed if we study the apparently related reactions not only of Stoics but also of later *Peripatetics* to the work of Aristotle, or at least to some of the work of Aristotle. A good case could be made, I believe, for seeing both Stoicism and the Peripatos of Lyco and Strato as a kind of Aristotelianism

without first philosophy, that is, as a growth from, or resuscitation of, the Aristotle of the *Analytics* and the *Eudemian Ethics*, where, it seems, there is no room for metaphysics. In the matter of physical enquiries here the pioneering work of Longrigg²⁵ has hardly been followed up. Perhaps scholars have been over-aroused and distracted by the claims of Sambursky²⁶ to see remarkable parallels between various ancient and modern notions in physics. Perhaps more attention to Aristotle and the Stoics on *pneuma*,²⁷ and on the curious parallels between some of the functions of *pneuma* and some of the roles of hormones in modern biology would be ultimately more rewarding.

Of the other Stoic sources apart from the Megarian logicians comparatively little has been done since Pohlenz. Long and Hahn have attempted to introduce some further discrimination into our treatment of Stoic use of the pre-Socratics, especially Heraclitus,²⁸ emphasizing, perhaps, what has been rather downplayed since Pohlenz and Solmsen,²⁹ the differing attitudes to be found among the earliest Stoic masters to their predecessors—with particular attention to Cleanthes. But it is to be hoped that the excesses of earlier attempts to separate Zeno and Chrysippus will not be repeated—though there is some ground for alarm at this stage. On the specific question of the relationship between the Stoics and Heraclitus in particular much still needs to be clarified, especially in view of Kahn's (to my mind) misguided attempt to read back the Stoic doctrine of the destruction of the cosmos by fire into the pre-Socratic period. This in fact is part of a much larger philological question which is still hardly treated by historians of Stoicism, and indeed by historians of ancient thought as a whole. So much of our “knowledge” of pre-Socratic and post-Aristotelian thought is due to the evidence of philosophical critics in late antiquity: the Middle Platonist Plutarch—where for Stoics we are now guided by Cherniss' Loeb (*Plutarch's Moralia*, v. 13, pt. 2)—the near-Aristotelian Alexander of Aphrodisias, the Neoplatonist Simplicius—hardly considered from a Stoic point of view since Rieth^{29A}—the Christian polymath Origen, the medical controversialist Galen whose *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* is now splendidly re-edited by P. De Lacy (CMG 10) 5.4.1.2, Berlin, 1978–1980). The purpose of such works, their reliability as sources, their habits as regards quotation, misinformation and disinformation, even their understanding of the texts they quote—not to speak of their frequently selective modes of quotation—need much more careful attention than they have generally received. Von Arnim's *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* is laden with quotations from Philo Judaeus, but who knows what Philo is doing with the so-called fragments? All these writers need close and prolonged scrutiny for their value as sources—which means they need to be better understood in their own right. Sharples, Todd, Verbeke and Donini in particular have begun such work with Alexander of Aphrodisias,³⁰ and Fortenbaugh has strengthened us to attend to Arius Didymus,³¹ but

Origen, whose learning and understanding of Stoic (and other) philosophical texts seems to be wide and deep, has hardly been touched.³² Even the more magpie-like figure of Clement of Alexandria and the less humble Tertullian would repay investigation, though the enquiries of Lilla and Mortley on the former,³³ and of Waszink in his monumental edition of the latter's *De Anima*,³⁴ have begun to clear the ground. It must be admitted, however, that the pioneering work of Spanneut on the influence of Stoicism on early Patristic texts has not been followed up;³⁵ nor have these texts been adequately exploited for material on the Stoics themselves.

This situation is part of a more general failure of philologists to sort out problems of a basic sort involved in any attempt to understand the thought of later antiquity. But it is harsh to blame the philologists. There are simply not enough of them. Indeed the burden on those who are capable of doing the *detailed* and *precise* work on the Greek and Latin texts which is required becomes greater year by year. And in any case I am speaking of two kinds of task in one breath: first the task of identifying Stoicizing practice and ideas in the writers of late antiquity not only with regard to an understanding of their own thought, but to determining what they are inclined to do, or are capable of doing, or could hardly avoid doing, to the Stoic (and other) philosophical writings which they use for their own purposes—whether those purposes involve an *acceptance* or a *rejection* of the philosophical ideas which are under discussion or in use.

What then of the issues themselves which have as yet been left aside? Where has the interest centered? In ethics, perhaps, the most interesting disagreements have appeared. Was Seneca, as a Stoic, what Calvin thought him to be, a master in ethics? And is it therefore proper to think of Stoicism as the Calvinism of the ancient world? What is the relationship in Stoicism between justice and mercy? Are there supererogatory acts? In what sense are all sins equal? What is Stoic detachment? Does it mean a suppression of all emotion or a suppression of irrational passions? What is the Stoic attitude to slavery? Other important and related topics also deserve thought. Are the Stoics pure anti-consequentialists in ethics? Has calculation of consequences any significance at all in an evaluation of the nature of a moral act? In what sense, if at all, do the Stoics have a concept of duty or of obligation? In broad terms is it justifiable to talk of Stoic ethics as deontological? Or is it naturalistic? And if so, in what sense?³⁶ Gerard Watson made certain enquiries into late Stoic talk of natural law.³⁷ On the whole these enquiries have not been followed up. Is Watson right in thinking that the notion of natural law in ethics has to do with Cicero, rather than with earlier Stoic theories?

Much energy has been put into the Stoic theory of action, on which a new book by Inwood is forthcoming, and on the notion of *oikeiosis*, the

idea that each of us has a natural concern with himself and with his own well-being. That notion, which the Stoics in some sense interpreted in relation to the first natural impulse of the self to self-preservation (where the Epicureans held that it is to pleasure, or at least to absence of pain or distress) was sometimes developed into the root of such concepts as justice or even the idea of the unity of mankind in what Marcus Aurelius calls the “dear city of Zeus”. How far such ideas are original to Stoicism, and how far they were developed, has been much debated.³⁹ Above all, in this area, what are the responsibilities of man to his fellows and what is the nature of the wise (and therefore perfect) man himself? Debate has raged over what the wise man knows and does,⁴⁰ and we have considered how one can know who the wise man is. Above all, perhaps, there has been interest in the Stoic claim that virtue alone is necessary for happiness, that it is virtually irremovable and that it is one. Graeser, Long and others have examined the question of the fundamental principles of Stoic ethics, as we have seen, while the practical implications of the theory of the sufficiency of virtue, though little considered among specialists on Stoicism itself, seem to have influenced writers concerned with the “politics” of survival, such as the psychologist Viktor Frankl. But there is also the problem of the relationship between the Stoic wise man (himself a fragment of Zeus in his “governing principle”, a fragment of the pantheistic god of the Stoic universe) and his fellow fragments. It is the problem of whether Stoicism dissolves into an individualism of monads or forms a community as envisaged by Epictetus and, in his pessimistic (and hence unstoic) way, by Marcus Aurelius. Though peripherally treated in the “literature” such basic matters lie largely undisturbed by philosophical evaluation.

Before leaving the realm of systematic Stoic themes, we should notice one which, I think, deserves special attention: the Stoic attempt to construct, in opposition to the prevailing views of Plato and to some extent of Aristotle too, a genuinely and completely psychosomatic account of the human person and of human nature. Here too the problem has been set up for some time, and some intriguing work has been done recently by Long.⁴¹ And the problem of evil and what it implies for theodicy, with related questions of providence, has been considered in its Stoic setting. The importance which the Stoics attached to it has been observed,⁴² though the relevance of Stoic proposals to contemporary theological problems needs more examination. The views of the Stoics may deserve more serious consideration than they have been given. On this matter the criticism of Stoicism by Origen and by Plotinus would repay closer attention. Finally—to move Stoically from ethics to physics—there are problems about the nature of Stoic theories of cause (which have provoked substantive discussions from Frede and Sorabji⁴³) and there is the more basic question of the nature of Stoic materialism, or rather vitalism,

itself. For the role of the so-called “incorporeals”, especially *lekta* (“meanings”), within Stoic “physics” is still far from clear; and the non-existence among Stoics of a mind-matter dualism, or at least its existence in an attenuated (or different) form in Stoic texts, is indeed fundamental, but still a source of confusion. Once again we confront a broad and difficult question for the understanding of ancient philosophy as a whole. The term “materialism” seems misleading at times even for the Epicureans, let alone for the pantheistic Stoics for whom, as Plotinus pointed out, God is matter in a certain condition or disposition.

Briefly, to conclude our tour, let us turn to individual Stoics. Here much has been done in some periods. I shall not attempt to be complete. But it is impossible to pass over von Fritz’ article on Zeno,⁴⁴ or the edition of the fragments of Panaetius (with commentary) achieved by van Straaten,⁴⁵ or the appearance of the first volume of the huge *Posidonius*—the commentary is still awaited—by Kidd, who took over and brought to completion whatever had been done over many years by Edelstein.⁴⁶ Late Stoicism has fared less well. For the Roman Stoics not much advance has been made since Bonhoeffer and the work, excellent indeed for its time, of Arnold,⁴⁷ though Hierocles is the subject of a forthcoming study by Inwood,⁴⁸ and Rist has attempted something on the sort of Stoicism (and non-Stoicism) we find in Marcus Aurelius,⁴⁹ a man whose particular interest (to me, at least) is that he poses in an acute form the two related questions “What exactly is a Stoic?, and “Can the Stoic live his Stoicism?” What are the minimal beliefs required before one can be identified as a member of the school in a non-trivial sense? For one of the effects of contemporary study of the Stoics has been to begin to disentangle the genuine Stoic from the picture-book straw-man constructed by mythologists, Kantian and otherwise. The problem of what it is to be a Stoic is, of course, importantly raised in the person of Seneca, an influential figure in historical as well as in literary and philosophical terms: but, apart from readings in the book of I. Hadot, we have learned little about him recently as a philosopher as distinct from a politician. Nevertheless, attention should be drawn wherever possible to the excellent study of his plays by Herington.⁵⁰

Here I intend to close. You will notice, perhaps, that a number of the more recent items I have listed are the fruits of various conferences: *Les Stoiciens et leur logique*, *Doubt and Dogmatism*, *Science and Speculation*, and the forthcoming proceedings of a conference on Hellenistic ethics held at Bad Homburg. It is a welcome development, and a sign of progress, though at times such occasions may be thought to degenerate to the “clubby”. I have said nothing of the tradition of Stoicism and its importance and direct philosophical influence outside antiquity, though in the case, for example, of Spinoza, I would believe it to be considerable; an excellent starting-point for such enquiries is available in the collected papers of Eymard d’Angers.⁵¹ Nor have I spoken of the

interaction of Stoicism with other ancient schools, some of which has been recently well scrutinized by Glucker.⁵² For the future, however, I should hope for further progress at a number of levels, some of which, as it were, are on the drawing-board. At the level of the availability of fragments Hülser has been publishing a series of volumes on Stoic dialectic, with German translation.⁵³ Some may hope that, eventually, the whole of von Arnim would be revised. I understand that Long and Sedley are in process of constructing a general work—on the lines of the treatment of the pre-Socratics by Kirk, Raven and Schofield—to make available (with discussion) the most important texts in the philosophy of the Hellenistic period in general, including, of course, the old Stoa. Such a book has long been needed urgently, to give the enquirer a tool somewhat less formidable (and less replete with philological problems) than the collection of von Arnim. At the same time work is going on towards what will eventually be a History of Hellenistic Philosophy by several hands, which will provide a continuation of Guthrie's *History of Greek Philosophy* into the period Guthrie himself was unable to reach. When all this, and much more, is complete, we shall be in an even better position than we are now to realize that the Stoics can teach us that propositional logic did not begin with Frege, that emphasis on epistemology did not begin with Descartes, that concern with universalizability did not begin with Kant, that concern with semantics did not begin with. . . . And there I will conclude. I am astonished at the difference of this mini-bibliography from that which I composed when I first wrote on the Stoics in 1969. It seems to me that it is not unfair to say that the last few decades have been something of a success story in the rediscovery of the Stoics, and that those of us who have had some small share in it should pat ourselves on the back and give ourselves a round of applause.⁵⁴

NOTES

¹ M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa* (Göttingen 1948). For Bonhoeffer see especially *Epictet und die Stoa* (Stuttgart 1890).

² A. M. Burnyeat, "Can the Sceptic Live his Scepticism?", in *Doubt and Dogmatism* (ed. M. Schofield, M. Burnyeat, J. Barnes, Oxford 1980) 20-53 and G. Striker, "Sceptical Strategies", *ibid.* 54-83.

³ J. Lukasiewicz, "On the history of the logic of propositions" (1934), available in *Selected Works* (ed. L. Borkowski, Amsterdam 1970).

⁴ I. M. Bochenksi, *Ancient Formal Logic* (Amsterdam 1951).

⁵ B. Mates, *Stoic Logic* (Berkeley 1953).

⁶ M. Frede, *Die stoische Logik* (Göttingen 1974); "Stoic and Aristotelian Syllogistic", *AGP* 56 (1974) 1-32.

⁷ I. Mueller, "Stoic and Peripatetic Logic", *AGP* 51 (1969) 173-187; "The Completeness of Stoic Propositional Logic", *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 20 (1979) 201-215; "An Introduction to Stoic Logic" in *The Stoics* (ed. J. M. Rist, Berkeley/L.A. 1978) 1-26.

⁸ J. Brunschwig (ed.), *Les stoiciens et leur logique* (Paris 1978); "Proof Defined", in *Doubt and Dogmatism* (see above note 1A) 125-160.

⁹ Mueller (note 6, 1978) 26, note 13.

¹⁰ Epictetus, 3.1.5ff., 2.4.11, 2.1.35 etc.

¹⁰ E.g. A. A. Long, "Language and Thought in Stoicism", in *Problems in Stoicism* (ed. A. A. Long, London 1971) 75-113; "The Distinction between Truth and the True" in *Les Stoiciens* (see note 7) 297-316; A. Graeser, "The Stoic Theory of Meaning", in *The Stoics* (note 6 above); G. Watson, *The Stoic Theory of Knowledge* (Belfast 1966); J. Annas, "Truth and Knowledge," in *Doubt and Dogmatism* (see note 1A) 84-104.

¹¹ L. Edelstein, *The Meaning of Stoicism* (Cambridge, Mass. 1966). More ideosyncratic still is J. Christensen, *An Essay on the Unity of Stoic Philosophy* (Copenhagen 1962).

¹² V. Goldschmidt, *Le système stoicien et l'idée de temps* (Paris³ 1977).

¹³ A. A. Long (ed.), *Problems in Stoicism* (London 1971), *Hellenistic Philosophy* (London 1974) 107-231.

¹⁴ J. M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy* (Cambridge 1969); *The Stoics* (ed.) (Berkeley/L.A. 1978).

¹⁵ F. H. Sandbach, *The Stoics* (London 1975).

¹⁶ A. A. Long, "Aristotle's Legacy to Stoic Ethics", *BICS* 15 (1968) 72-85; "Language and Thought in Stoicism" (see note 10 above) 173-199; "The Early Stoic Concept of Moral Choice", in *Images of Man (Studia Verbeke)* (ed. F. Boissier, Louvain 1976) 77-92.

¹⁷ A. C. Lloyd, "Action and Decision in Stoic Psychology" in *The Stoics* (see note 14 above) 233-246; "Activity and Description in Aristotle and the Stoa", *PBA* 56 (1970) 227-240.

¹⁸ J. M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy* (see note 14 above).

¹⁹ D. Hahm, *Stoic Cosmology* (Ohio 1977).

²⁰ F. H. Sandbach, forthcoming in *PCPS* monographs.

²¹ A. J. Voelke, *L'idée de volonté dans le stoïcisme* (Paris 1973); M. Reesor, "Fate and Possibility in Early Stoic Philosophy", *Phoenix* 19 (1965) 285-297; A. A. Long, "Stoic Determinism and Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De Fato* 1-14", *AGP* 52 (1970) 265-268; "Freedom and Determinism in the Stoic Theory of Human Action", in *Problems in Stoicism* (note 13 above) 173-199; P. L. Donini, "Fato e volontà umana in Crisippo", *Atti dell' Accademia delle Scienze di Torino* 109 (1974-1975) 1-44; C. Stough, "Stoic Determinism and Moral Responsibility", in *The Stoics* (see note 14 above) 203-232. There is an earlier excellent article: W. Theiler, "Tacitus und die antike Schicksalslehre", *Phyllobolia für P. van der Muehl* (Basel 1946) 35-90.

²² M. Lapidge, "Archai and Stoicheia: A Problem in Stoic Cosmology", *Phronesis* 18 (1973) 240-278; "Stoic Cosmology" in *The Stoics* (see note 14 above) 161-185.

²³ D. Hahm (see note 19).

²⁴ Frede (see note 5 above); Mueller (see note 6 above); M. F. Burnyeat, "The origins of non-ductive inference", in *Science and Speculation* (ed. J. Barnes, J. Brunschwig, M. Burnyeat, M. Schofield, Cambridge/Paris 1982) 193-238.

^{24A} H. C. Baldry, "Zeno's Ideal Stoic", *JHS* 79 (1959) 3-15; J. M. Rist, "Zeno and Stoic Consistency", *Phronesis* 22 (1967) 161-174.

²⁵ J. Longrigg, "Elementary Physics in the Lyceum and the Stoa", *Isis* 66 (1975) 211-229.

²⁶ S. Sambursky, *The Physical World of the Greeks* (London 1956); *Physics of the Stoics* (London 1959).

²⁷ G. Verbeke, *L'évolution de la doctrine du pneuma du stoïcisme à S. Augustin* (Paris² 1951); F. Solmsen, "Greek Philosophy and the Discovery of the Nerves", *Mus. Helv.* 18 (1961) 150-167, 169-197; M. Nussbaum, *Aristotle's De Motu Animalium* (Princeton 1978) 143-164; A. L. Peck, *Aristotle's Generation of Animals* (Loeb edition, London/Cambridge, Mass., rev. 1953) 576-578.

²⁸ A. A. Long, "Heraclitus and Stoicism", *ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑ* 5-6 (1975-76) 133-156; Hahm (above note 19) 144-156.

²⁹ F. Solmsen, *Cleanthes or Posidonius? The Basis of Stoic Physics* (Amsterdam 1961).

^{29A} O. Rieth, *Grundbegriffe der stoischen Ethik* (Berlin 1933).

³⁰ For R. W. Sharples see especially *Alexander of Aphrodisias on Fate* (London 1983) with further items listed on p. 287; "An Ancient Dialogue on Possibility: Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Quaestio* 1.4, *AGP* 64 (1982) 23-38; R. B. Todd, *Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics* (Leiden 1976); G. Verbeke, "Stoicisme et Aristotelisme dans le *De Fato*

d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise," *AGP* 50 (1968) 73-100; P. L. Donini, *Tre studi sull'Aristotelismo nel II secolo D. C.* (Turin 1974).

³¹ W. W. Fortenbaugh (ed.), *On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics* (New Brunswick/London 1983). The "doxographical" articles of C. H. Kahn, "Arius as a Doxographer", 3-13, and of A. A. Long, "Arius Didymus and the exposition of Stoic Ethics", 41-65, are particularly useful.

³² H. Chadwick, "Origen, Celsus and the Stoa", *JTS* 48 (1947) 34-49; "Origen" in *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Mediaeval Philosophy* (ed. A. H. Armstrong, Cambridge 1967) 182-192; L. Roberts, "Origen and Stoic Logic", *TAPA* 101 (1970) 433-444; J. M. Rist, "The Importance of Stoic Logic in the *Contra Celsum*" in *Neoplatonism and Early Christian Thought* (ed. H. J. Blumenthal and R. A. Markus, London 1981) 64-78; "Beyond Stoic and Platonist: A Sample of Origen's Treatment of Philosophy (*Contra Celsum*: 4.62-70)" in *Platonismus und Christentum* (Festschrift für H. Doerr, ed. H. D. Blume and F. Mann, Münster 1983) 228-238.

³³ S. Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria: a study of Christian Platonism and Gnostism* (Oxford 1971); R. Mortley, *Connaissance religieuse et herménéutique chez Clément d'Alexandrie* (Leiden 1973).

³⁴ J. H. Waszink, *Tertulliani De Anima* (Leiden 1947).

³⁵ M. Spanneut, *Le Stoïcisme des Pères de l'église* (Paris² 1969).

³⁶ A. A. Long, "The Logical Basis of Stoic Ethics," (*PAS* 1970-1971) 85-104; A. Graeser, "Zur Begründung der Stoischen Ethik", *Kant-Studien* 63 (1972) 213-224; "Zur Funktion des Begriffes 'gut' in der Stoischen Ethik", *Zeitschrift für Phil. Forschung* 26 (1972) 417-425; N. P. White, "The Basis of Stoic Ethics", *HSCP* 83 (1979) 143-178.

³⁷ G. Watson, "The Natural Law and Stoicism", in *Problems in Stoicism* (note 13 above) 216-238. See also J. Sprute, "Rechts-und Staatsphilosophie bei Cicero", *Phronesis* 28 (1983) 150-176.

³⁸ B. Inwood, *Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism* (forthcoming Oxford 1985); the basic study is that of S. G. Pembroke, "Oikeiosis", in *Problems in Stoicism* (see note 13 above) 114-149; also G. B. Kerferd, "The Search for Personal Identity in Stoic Thought", *Bull. of the John Rylands University Library of Manchester* 55 (1972) 177-196; G. Striker, "The Role of Oikeiosis in Stoic Ethics", *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 1 (1983) 145-167.

³⁹ Cf. H. C. Baldry, "Zeno's Ideal State", *JHS* 79 (1959) 3-15; *The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought* (Cambridge 1965).

⁴⁰ A. J. B. Stockdale, "The World of Epictetus", *The Atlantic* (April 1978) 98-106.

⁴⁰ A. A. Long, "Dialectic and the Stoic Sage", in *The Stoics* (see above note 14) 101-124; G. B. Kerferd, "What does the Wise Man Know?", *ibid.* 125-136.

⁴¹ A. A. Long, "Soul and Body in Stoicism", *Colloquy* 36, *Center for Hermeneutical Studies* (Berkeley 1980) = *Phronesis* 27 (1982) 34-57.

⁴² A. A. Long, "The Stoic Concept of Evil", *PQ* 18 (1968) 329-343; G. B. Kerferd, "The Origin of Evil in Stoic Thought", *Bull. of the John Rylands University Library of Manchester* 60 (1978) 482-494.

⁴³ M. Frede, "The Original Notion of Cause", in *Doubt and Dogmatism* (see above note 7) 217-249, and R. Sorabji, "Causation, Laws, and Necessity", *ibid.* 250-282.

⁴⁴ K. von Fritz, *RE Suppl.* 10A (1972) cols. 83-121.

⁴⁵ M. van Straaten, *Panétius, sa vie, ses écrits et sa doctrine* (Amsterdam 1946); *Panaetius Rhodius: Fragmenta* (Leiden³ 1962).

⁴⁶ L. Edelstein and I. G. Kidd, *Posidonius* vol. 1 (Cambridge 1972). Kidd has also produced a series of papers on Stoicism and in particular on Posidonius: e.g. "The Relation of Stoic Intermediates to the *Summum Bonum*, with reference to Change in the Stoa", *CQ* 5 (1955) 181-194; "Posidonius on Emotions", in *Problems in Stoicism* (see note 13 above); "Moral Actions and Rules in Stoic Ethics", in *The Stoics* (see above note 14) 247-258. For some of the more reasonable recent comment on Posidonius see M. Laffranque, *Poseidonius d'Apamée* (Paris 1964).

⁴⁷ E. V. Arnold, *Roman Stoicism* (Cambridge 1911).

⁴⁸ B. Inwood, "Hierocles: Theory and Argument in the Second-Century A.D.", *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 2 (1984) 151-183.

⁴⁹ J. M. Rist, "Are you a Stoic? The Case of Marcus Aurelius", in *Jewish and Christian Self-Definition* (ed. B. F. Meyer and E. P. Sanders, London/Philadelphia 1982) 23-45; cf. P. A. Brunt, "Marcus Aurelius in his *Meditations*", *JRS* 64 (1974) 1-20.

⁵⁰ I. Hadot, *Seneca und die griechisch-römische Tradition der Seelenleitung* (Berlin 1969). J. Herington, "Senecan Tragedy", *Arion* 5 (1966) 422-471 (reprinted in *Essays in Classical Literature selected from Arion* (Cambridge 1972) 170-219. Cf. P. Grimal, *Sénèque ou la conscience de l'Empire* (Paris 1978).

⁵¹ J. Eymard d'Angers, *Recherches sur le stoicisme aux XVI^e et XVII^e siècles* (Hildesheim/N.Y. 1976).

⁵² J. Glucker, *Antiochus and the Late Academy* (Göttingen 1978).

⁵³ K. Hülser, *Die Fragmente zur Dialektik der Stoiker* (Konstanz 1982) Bd. I-IV.

⁵⁴ I should like to thank my colleague Brad Inwood for his help in preparing this preview.